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CHAPTER 4 
Employment Discriminat[on 
WILLIAM T. SHERRY, JR.* 
DAVID E. WATSON** 
§ 4.1. Introduction. This is the first volume of the S~rvey to contain 
a chapter concerning the general subject of the Massachusetts statutes 
and caselaw prohibiting employment discrimination.• ~his chapter has 
been included in recognition of the increasing litigatio growing out of 
employment discrimination on both the federal and stat levels. In addi-
tion to reviewing the relevant developments that occurred in this area 
during the Survey year, this chapter will examine antl-discrimination 
statutes previously enacted by the legislature, and th~ir prior judicial 
construction. 2 
§4.2. Employment Discrimination Statutes. The q_rincipal statute 
which prohibits discrimination generally is chapter 151~ of the General 
Laws. Section 4(1) of chapter 151B provides, inter alia, that it shall be 
an unlawful practice for an employer• to refuse to hire or employ or to 
bar or discharge from employment any person, or ~o discriminate 
against any person in compensation or in terms, conditibns or privileges 
of employment because of that person's race, color, religious creed/ 
* William T. Sherry, Jr. is a junior partner in the Boston law firm of Nutter, McClen-
nen & Fish. 
•• David E. Watson is an associate in the Boston law firm of Nutter, McClennen & 
Fish. i 
§4.1. 1 Other volumes of the Survey have considered specific anti-liiscrimination sub-
jects. See, e.g., Lund & Healy, Sex Discrimination 1971 ANN. SURv. MASs. LAw c. 20, at 
562-575. .I 
2 This chapter will not consider discrimination against individuals f~r engaging in activ-
ities protected under any labor relations statutes. ! 
§4.2. 1 G.L. c. 151B, §1(5) specifically excludes from the definition of the term 
"employer" ". . . a club exclusively social, or a fraternal aBBOCiatio~ or corporation, if 
such club, association or corporation is not organized for private proQt .... "The Com-
monwealth, its political subdivisions, boards, departments and commiBBions are specifi-
cally denominated as "employers." § 1(5) excludes from coverage employers of fewer than 
six persons. I 
2 G.L. c. 151B, §1(5), however, specifically permits any religious or denominational 
institution or organization, or any organization operated for charitable or educational 1
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national origin, sex, age, 3 or ancestry, unless based upon a bona fide 
occupational qualification. 
Section 5 of chapter 151B gives the Massachusetts Commission 
Against Discrimination• ("Commission") broad jurisdiction to adminis-
ter and effectuate the provisions of that chapter. Under section 5, a 
person claiming to be aggrieved by an alleged violation of section 4(1) 
may, within six months after the alleged act of discrimination, file a 
complaint with the Commission.5 After the filing of the complaint a 
Commissioner is assigned to conduct an investigation of the alleged un-
lawful practices. If the Commissioner finds on the basis of his investiga-
tion that there is probable cause to credit the complainant's allegations, 
he is to attempt to eliminate the alleged unlawful practices by 
"conference, conciliation and persuasion."• If these measures fail to 
eliminate the practices, or in advance thereof of the Commissioner finds 
that the circumstances so warrant, the Commission is required by sec-
tion 5 to cause to be issued and served on the respondent employer a 
written notice of a hearing before the Commission at which the employer 
is to answer the charges of the complaint. If upon all the evidence 
presented at the hearing, the Commission finds that the employer has 
engaged in any unlawful practices, the Commission shall state its find-
ings of fact and shall order the employer to cease and desist from the 
unlawful practices and to take other affirmative steps as it deems neces-
sary.7 
Section 6 of chapter 151B establishes the right to judicial review of 
orders or decisions issued by the Commission.8 Under this section, a 
purposes, which is operated, supervised or controlled by or in connection with a religious 
organization and which limits enrollment, admission or participation to members of that 
religion, to give preference in hiring or employing members of that religion. G.L. c. 151B, 
§4(2) requires an employer to reasonably accommodate the religious needs of its employ-
ees. 
' G.L. c. 151B, §1(8) provides that the term "age" "includes any person between the 
ages of forty and sixty-five." 
• The Commission is established under G.L. c. 6, §56, and its functions, powers and 
duties are set forth in G.L. c. 151B, §§2, 3, 5, & 6. During the Survey year, §56 was 
amended to provide for the appointment of three (3) full time commissioners to be ap-
pointed by the Governor for a term of three (3) years. Acts of 1976, c. 463. 
• The Attorney General may also file such complaints, and the Commission has the 
power to issue a complaint whenever it has reason to believe that an unlawful practice 
has occurred. G.L. c. 151B, §5. 
• If the Commissioner determines that no probable cause exists for crediting the allega-
tions of the complaint, the Commission is required to so notify the complainant in writing 
within 10 days after such service file with the Commission a written request for a 
"preliminary hearing" before the Commission. Id. 
7 I d. See East Chop Tennis Club v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 
364 Mass. 444, 447, 305 N.E.2d 507, 510 (1973). 
• G.L. c. 151B, §9 gives the complainant a right at the expiration of 90 days after the 
2
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"complainant, respondent or other person aggrieved by s ch order" may 
initiate a proceeding in the superior court. The court s all review the 
Commission's order or decision in accordance with the s andards of re-
view established in section 14(8) of chapter 30A; shall n t consider any 
objection that was not raised before the Commission exce tin extraordi-
nary circumstances; and has the power to enter an orde or decree en-
forcing, modifying or setting aside in whole or in part the Commission's 
order. Section 6 also empowers the court to enter an rder or decree 
enforcing, modifying or setting aside in whole or in par the Commis-
sion's order. 
In addition to the provisions of chapter 151B genera ly prohibiting 
employment discrimination, the legislature has also aced to prohibit 
particular forms of employment discrimination. Thus, he legislature 
has seen fit to prohibit certain discrimination on the ba is of age. Sec-
tion 24A of chapter 149 of the General Laws provides t at it is ". . . 
against public policy to dismiss from employment any erson between 
the ages of forty-five and sixty-five, or to refuse to emplo him, because 
of his age." The penalty for violating this provision is set orth in section 
24G of chapter 149 which permits the Commissioner of t e Department 
of Labor and Industries to publish the names of any employer who 
violates section 24A in newspapers circulating withi the common-
wealth. 1 The Supreme Judicial Court has held that sect on 24 does not 
create a civil remedy. 10 
The legislature has also seen fit to take action to prohi it employment 
discrimination against the handicapped. Section 24K f chapter 149 
makes it unlawful to dismiss from employment or to refus to hire, solely 
because of his handicap, ". . . any rehabilitated handi apped person 
who possesses the physical and mental capacity to perfor the functions 
required by said employment .... ;, Violations of secti n 24K may be 
punished by a fine of up to $200. 
Section 105A of chapter 149 prohibits discrimination rn the basis of 
sex. Section 105A provides that: ~ 
No employer shall discriminate in any way in the payment of 
wages as between the sexes, or pay any female in his e ploy salary 
or wage rates less than the rates paid to male emplo es for work 
filing of a complaint, or sooner if the Commission assents in writing, to ring a civil action 
for damages or injunctive relief, or both, in superior court. An actio filed under that 
section must be filed within two (2) years after the alleged unlawful ractice occurred. 
Presumably, if the complaint were not filed With the Commiaaion withi the six (6) month 
limitations period contained in c. 151B, 04, no action could be brou t under 09. 
' G.L. c. 149, §24B provides that any contract, agreement or un eretanding which 
prevents or tends to prevent the employment of any person between th ages of 45 and 65 
because of his age shall be null and void. 
11 Johnson v. United States Steel Corp., 348 Maaa. 168, 170,202 N.E. d 816,818 (1964). 
3
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of like or comparable character or work on like or comparable 
operations; provided, however, that variations in rates of pay shall 
not be prohibited when based upon a difference in seniority. 
65 
Section 105A further provides that an employer who violates any provi-
sion thereof shall be liable in the amount of the unpaid wages, and in 
an additional amount of liquidated damages. Actions to recover such 
wages may be brought by any one or more employees for themselves and 
other similarly situated employees, and the statute specifically provides 
for an award of attorney's fees to a successful plaintiff. 
In addition to the statutes prohibiting employment discrimination 
generally and in its particular forms, another more general prohibition 
on discrimination in all its forms is found in Part I, Article I of the state 
constitution which provides in part that: "Equality under the law shall 
not be denied or abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national 
origin." This provision, which is generally referred to as the "equal 
rights amendment," was added to Article I in 1976. While the amend-
ment may ultimately become a potent weapon against discrimination, 
as of the end of the Survey year there appeared to be no reported deci-
sions interpreting it. 
§4.3. Employment Discrimination-Standards of 
Proof-Rebutting a Prima Facie Case. In Wheelock College v. Massa-
chusetts Commission Against Discrimination• the Supreme Judicial 
Court considered for the first time the proof necessary to establish un-
lawful employment discrimination in violation of chapter 151B. 
The genesis of Wheelock College was a complaint filed with the Mas-
sachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("Commission") by 
Constance Kehoe ("the teacher"), a former faculty member at Whee-
lock College ("the college") who claimed that her contract for the 1971-
72 academic year was not renewed because of her sex, in violation of 
chapter 151B.2 In June of 1974, Commissioner Healey filed findings of 
fact and conclusions oflaw, based solely on her reading of the transcript 
and her review of the exhibits. 
The .Commissioner determined that the teacher had made out a prima 
facie case of discrimination and that principles enunciated by the 
United States Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Greena 
mandated that the burden then shift to the employer to "meet the issues 
with a defense that is credible, competent and reliable."• Examining the 
college's defense, the Commissioner found that the reasons given by the 
college for not rehiring the teacher were the teacher's numerous changes 
§4.3. 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2334, 355 N.E.2d 309. 
• ld. at 2335, 355 N.E.2d at 311 . 
• 411 u.s. 772, 802 (1973). 
4 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2339, 355 N.E.2d at 313. 
4
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in her teaching schedule; her irregular attendance at faculty meetings; 
and student complaints.0 
In examining each of these reasons separately, Commissioner Healy 
found first that Kehoe's schedule changes, apart from aternity leaves, 
were not substantially different from those of other fac lty.6 Moreover, 
the Commissioner could find no clear obligation on th teacher's part 
to attend faculty meetings.7 Finally, the Commissione found the evi-
dence of student complaints unpersuasive in light of co trary evidence 
of favorable evaluations from other students. 
The Commissioner concluded by finding that the college's stated rea-
sons for terminating the teacher were not credible and supported by the 
evidence, and thus were insufficient to rebut a prima facie case of dis-
crimination. 8 Therefore the Commissioner entered an order directing the 
college to reinstate the complainant with back pay. The college ap-
pealed this decision and order to the full Commission, a~d the full Com-
mission affirmed.' The college then filed a petition for r view in superior 
court under section 6 of chapter 151B, which provid s for review of 
Commission orders in accordance with chapter 30A.18 T e superior court 
entered judgment for the college, finding, on the basis of its review of 
the record before the Commission, no merit in the teacher's claim of 
discrimination." The Supreme Judicial Court granted the college's re-
quest for direct appellate review, reversed the Commission's decision, 
and remanded the case to the Commission. 12 
In reversing, the Court concluded that the Commission had in 
several respects misapplied the law governing the bu!den of proof in 
discrimination cases. First, the Court noted that the b · efs for both the 
Commission and the teacher argued that there was subs antial evidence 
to support a finding of discrimination but that neither rief had argued 
that a prima facie case had been established.13 The Co rt thus inferred 
that the Commission had appeared to abandon its conclusion that the 
teacher had established a prima facie case. Accordingly, the Court con-
cluded that the issue became "whether Kehoe has proved sex discrimi-
• Id. at 2338, 355 N.E.2d at 312. 
• Id. 
7 /d. 
' Id. at 2335, 335 N.E.2d at 311. 
• Id. 
11 /d. at 2336, 355 N.E.2d at 311. 
II /d. 
12 /d. at 2344, 355 N.E.2d at 313. The Court indicated that its disposition of the case 
was based on its own review of the record before the Commission. Id. at 2336, 355 N.E.2d 
at 311. Thus, the Court did not consider the superior court's holding at length. However, 
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nation without regard to the prima facie case."14 Since the Commission 
had not resolved this issue in its initial findings and conclusions, the 
Court remanded the case to the Commission for consideration of the 
issue. 16 
Moreover, the Court determined that there. was an additional reason 
for remanding the case to the Commission. Particularly, the Court rea-
soned that even if a prima facie case were established, the Commission's 
treatment of the reasons advanced by the college to rebut the plaintiffs 
allegations was erroneous as a matter of law .18 The Court concluded that 
the reasons for the failure to rehire advanced by the college were sufl'i-
cient to answer a prima facie case in that the reasons were legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory and supported by the evidence. 17 In so concluding, 
the Court disagreed with the Commission's interpretation of McDonnell 
Douglas as mandating that, to answer a prima facie case an employer 
must put forth "a defense that is credible, competent and reliable." 
In the words of the Court: 
All that is required by [McDonnell Douglas] in answer to the 
employee's prima facie case is that the employer "articulate some 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its action .... Any 
consideration of whether the employer's defense was "competent" 
or "reliable" is clearly extraneous. Nor does the word "credible" 
fully describe the test to be applied. The first issue is not 
"credibility," but whether the reason is nondiscriminatory. The 
second issue, whether the reason given was the real reason or 
merely pretextual, may involve questions of credibility, but here, 
as we have said, the burden of persuasion rests on the employee. 1K 
Having set forth its reasons for remanding the case to the Commis-
sion, the Court then expressed its views more generally "concerning the 
role of the commission and the proof required before it."11 The Court 
first advised that it is not the Commission's function to protect employ-
ees against all cases of arbitrary management or poor managerial judg-
ment, but rather only against unlawful discrimination.20 However, the 
Court reasoned that a complainant can rarely prove employment dis-
crimination by offering direct evidence.21 The Court therefore accepted 
the principle that a complainant by showing certain basic facts can 
prove a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination and thereby shift 
the burden to the employer to produce a lawful explanation for its deci-
14 /d. at 2340, 355 N.E.2d at 313. 
15 /d. at 2339, 355 N.E.2d at 313. 
11 /d. at 2340, 355 N.E.2d at 313. 
17 /d. 
18 /d. at 2341, 355 N.E.2d at 313-14. 
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sion. The Court also adopted the federal standard whi~h requires the 
employer to come forward with evidence to show that he reasons ad-
vanced were the real reasons for the employment deci ions.22 Thus if 
plaintiff proves a prima facie case which is unrebutted, or the employer 
produces evidence which is wholly disbelieved, the plaintiff will prevail. 
However, if the employer comes forward with apparently nondiscrimi-
natory reasons for the employment decision, the burdet then shifts to 
the complainant to prove by a preponderance of the ev dence that the 
reason or reasons stated by the respondent were not the eal reasons for 
its action.23 
While the Court thus saw fit to establish general guidelines for allo-
cating the burden of proof once a prima facie case istestablished, it 
declined to define exactly the elements a complainant as to prove to 
make out a prima facie case of sex discrimination. This mission seems 
particularly significant in light of the Court's recognition that, on re-
mand, the Commission could reconsider the issue of whether the 
teacher had made out a prima facie case.24 However, wht'le it did not set 
forth precise standards for establishing a prima facie ase, the Court 
seemed nevertheless to establish general guidelines. T us, the Court 
indicated that "[w]e would not find support for a prima facie case 
resting solely on the fact that the college declined to rehire a woman who 
was qualified academically to hold a teaching position wiere that teach-
ing position was abolished."25 Moreover, the Court app ared more spe-
cifically to indicate that the proof required to establis a prima facie 
case under chapter 151B is akin to that which McDonnell Douglas26 
required to establish a prima facie Title VII violation. In particular, the 
adoption by analogy of federal standards seemed implic:·t in the Court's 
reasoning that because McDonnell Douglas involved a refusal to hire 
rather than a discharge or nonrenewal of an employment contract, it did 
not fully answer the question of the specific burden of proof in a case 
such as Wheelock College.21 This reasoning implied that McDonnell 
Douglas standards would govern to the extent that a fa~t situation in a 
chapter 151B proceeding paralleled the fact situatio~ in McDonnell 
Douglas. 1 
Thus, since Wheelock College implies the application 1 of federal stan-
dards to chapter 151B proceedings, it would appear instructive to note 
how certain lower federal courts that have adapted McDonnell Douglas 
I 
22 ld. at 2344, 355 N.E.2d at 315. 
Z3 ld. 
•• ld. at 2340 n.6, 355 N.E.2d at 313 n.6. 
11 ld. at 2339-40 & n.6, 356 N.E.2d at 313 & n.6. 
21 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2339 n.5, 355~.E.2d at 313 n.5. 
17 Id. at 2339-40 n.5 & 6, 355 N.E.2d at 313 n.5 & 6. In cases here the person is 
terminated as a result of not having received tenure, the plaintiff may also be required to 
prove that the procedure that led to the denial of tenure and terminati n was "irregular." 
Huang v. College of the Holy Cross, 15 FEP Cases 706, 718 (0. Mass. 1977). 7
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to cases involving discharges or nonrenewals of employment. These 
courts have generally held that a plaintiff in order to make out a prima 
facie case under Title VII must show that (i) she belongs to a protected 
class under the Act; (ii) that she was qualified for the position she held 
and was not retained despite her qualifications for the position, and (iii) 
following her termination the employer retained an applicant with her 
qualifications. 28 While the Massachusetts courts are clearly not bound 
to adopt this approach, Wheelock College indicates a likelihood that 
they will do so. 
§4.4. Remedial Power of the Commission-Attorneys' 
Fees-Damages for Emotional Distress. In Bournewood Hospital v. 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 1 a complaint was 
filed with the Commission charging that Bournewood Hospital ("the 
hospital") was engaging in unlawful sex discrimination by paying 
women 10 cents less per hour than men performing equivalent work. 2 
Subsequently, the complainant filed a second complaint alleging that 
the hospital had retaliated against her for making the initial complaint.3 
The basis for her claim of retaliation was that after the filing of her 
complaint the hospital had offered her a "promotional" position, but 
that the employer refused to raise her pay to the rate associated with 
the promotional position until and unless she proved capable of per-
forming the duties; and that complainant had performed her promo-
tional duties for only two weeks when the hospital hired an outside 
applicant with less experience to fill the position permanently at a 
higher salary without a trial period. 4 The Commission found that there 
had been both an equal pay violation and retaliatory conduct on the 
part of the hospital.5 Accordingly, the Commission entered an order 
requiring the hospital to cease and desist from sex discrimination and 
to equalize wage rates.• In addition, the Commission ordered the 
hospital to make the complainant whole for the equal pay violation; to 
pay $2,000 in damages for complainant's "emotional distress, pain and 
suffering;" and to pay the complainant the difference between her 
salary and the salary associated with the promotional position from 
the date she was offered the position until her employment terminated. 
18 Davis v. Weidner, 14 FEP Cases 544, 548 (E.D. Wis. 1976). 
§4.4. 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2554, 358 N.E.2d 235. 
• Id. at 2555, 358 N.E.2d at 236. 
s Id. 
4 Id. at 2566, 358 N.E.2d at 241. 
• Id. 
• Id. at 2556, 358 N.E.2d at 237. 
8
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Finally, the Commission ordered the hospital to pay $2, in attorneys' 
fees for complainant.7 
The hospital obtained review in the superior court. T e court set aside 
the awards for attorneys' fees and emotional distress d modified the 
order to provide back pay at the promotional position for only the two 
weeks she actually held that position. This judgment as appealed by 
the complainant.• The Supreme Judicial Court affir ed the setting 
aside by the court of attorneys' fees and the court's m dification of the 
back pay award, but it reversed the setting aside of th award of dam-
ages for emotional distress. • 
As to attorneys' fees, the complainant had argued o appeal that the 
award of such fees was proper under the Commission's tatutory author-
ity to take such aff'umative action as was appropriate 0 to remedy em-
ployment discrimination; and, alternatively, that fe s should be re-
coverable under the "private attorney general" doctri e. 11 With regard 
to the second argument, the Commissioner had agree with the com-
plainant and found that the hospital had "pursued dis riminatory poli-
cies which not only violate the interests of [the empl yee], but which 
have affected the public interest as well." The Court recognized that 
attorneys' fees have been awarded under similar fact ituations in fed-
eral civil rights actions.l2 However, the Court rejec d the Commis-
sioner's finding and found support for a contrary etermination in 
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Socie y. 13 In Alyeska 
Pipeline, the United States Supreme Court held that n the absence of 
statutory authorizations the traditional "American R le" of not grant-
ing attorney's fees to the winning litigant would apply. 4 The Court held 
that it was for Congress, not the courts, to reverse t is long-standing 
tradition. In so holding the Supreme Court expressed isapproval of the 
growing trend of the lower federal courts to award at rneys' fees when 
those courts deemed the public policy furthered by a statute necessi-
tated granting such an award.11 The Supreme Judicia Court, although 
not bound by the Alyeska Pipeline decision, indicated that it was suffi-
'M ~ 1 The complainant had been allowed to intervene at the auperio court level. G.L. c. 30A, §14(2) provides that all "parties to the proceeding before the Agency" may inter-
vene aa of right in a proceeding for review of an agency decision. Wh ther or not this right 
extends to petitions for enforcement has apparently not been deci ed. 
1 1976 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 2558, 358 N.E.2d at 237-38. I 
II G.L. c. 151B, §5. . 
11 1976 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 2558, 358 N.E.2d at 238. · 
12 Id. at 2562, 358 N.E.2d at 239. 
IS 421 U.S. 240 (1975), 
1
' ld. at 270-71. 
II Jd. at 271. 
9
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ciently persuaded by its reasoning to adopt the result of that case as 
Massachusetts law. 
The Court also rejected the complainant's argument that the Com-
mission possessed statutory authority to award attorneys' fees. The 
complainant had argued the appropriateness of the award on the 
ground that section 5 of chapter 151B gives the Commission broad 
remedial authority to "take such affirmative action, including, but not 
limited to, hiring, reinstatement or regrading of employees .... " 
Moreover, the complainant had noted section 9 provides for recovery of 
attorneys' fees if the complainant exercises his option to pursue an 
employment discrimination claim in court rather than with the Com-
mission. Additionally section 5 explicitly precluded recovery of attor-
neys' fees in housing discrimination cases before the Commission while 
providing no such disqualification for employment discrimination 
claims. Thus, the complainant contended that section 5, particularly if 
read in conjunction with section 9, constituted an authorization to the 
Commission to award attorneys' fees. The Court disagreed, however, 
and found that the award of attorneys' fees was improper because the 
statute does not explicitly give the Commission such power. 18 The Court 
nevertheless appeared to indicate some dissatisfaction with this result, 
noting the incongruity existing between the legislature's authorization 
of attorneys' fees to successful litigants in cases originally brought in 
superior court and its nonauthorization of such fees in cases originally 
brought before the Commission. Moreover, the Court acknowledged the 
forum shopping which may inevitably result, which the Court character-
ized as "unfortunate and unhealthy." However, the Court interpreted 
the legislative silence as indicating that the Commission is not empow-
ered to grant attorneys' fees in employment discrimination cases. 17 
The award of damages for emotional distress was found appropriate 
and upheld by the Court. In upholding that award the Court rejected 
the hospital's claim that an award of either compensatory or punitive 
damages for emotional distress was in excess of the Commission's statu-
tory authority in employment discrimination cases. 18 In particular, the 
Court found in the statutory power of the Commission to take such 
affirmative action as will effectuate the purposes of chapter 151B an 
authorization to the Commission to fashion appropriate remedies for the 
natural and probable consequences of retaliation. 19 Emphasizing the 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2561, 358 N.E.2d at 239. 
17 ld. 
•• ld. at 2569, 358 N.E.2d at 242. 
11 Id. at 2569, 358 N.E.2d at 242. This is the same statutory provision on which the 
complainant based her claim for attorneys' fees. The Court took notice of its own seeming 
inconsistency in using a broad interpretation to grant the emotional distress award and a 
restrictive approach to bar the attorneys' fees. The Court resolved the contradiction by 
10
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"egregious" character of retaliations for filing a com laint with the 
Commission, 28 the Court reasoned that in many cases f such retalia-
tion, a remedy short of damages, for emotional distres would fail to 
make the aggrieved party whole. While the Court thus found that the 
Commission could award compensatory damages for re aliation, it did 
not discuss the question of punitive damages, since it fo nd "no sugges-
tion in the record ... [that the Commission] awarded emotional dis-
tress damages to punish Boumewood for engaging in a ractice prohib-
ited by [section 4 of chapter 151B]."21 
The Court also considered whether there was substan ial evidence to 
support the award of damages for emotional distress. N ting its obliga-
tion to give due weight to the experience, technical c mpetence and 
specialized knowledge of administrative agencies, the C urt upheld the 
Commission's determination that there was substantial evidence of re-
taliation.22 In upholding the Commission's determinatio , the Court set 
aside the superior court's fmding that the hospital ha acted in good 
faith and not in a retaliatory fashion. Moreover, rejecti g the hospital's 
contention that there had been insufficient evidence of a tual emotional 
distress, the Court concluded that "the finding of retali tion alone per-
mitted the inference of the emotional distress as a norm 1 adjunct of the 
hospital's actions."23 
Bournewood Hospital leaves open significant quest ons concerning 
the scope of the Commission's authority to· award damag s for em-otional 
distress. One such question is whether the Commission s authorized to 
award such damages in cases not involving findings of r taliation for an 
employee's filing a complaint with the Commission. Wi h regard to this 
question, the language in Bournewood Hospital emphas zing the partic-
ular egregiousness of retaliatory discrimination, appears to indicate that 
the Court views "emotional distress" damages as aw rdable only in 
citing to cases which point out that there is no common law basis fo an administrative 
agency awarding attorney's fees but that such a basis exists for da age awards. ld. at 
2569-70 n.10, 358 N.E.2d at 242. n.10. 
•Id. 
11 I d. at 2568, 358 N .E.2d at 242. i 
11 ld. at 2570, 358 N .E.2d a~ 243. ~~ 
11 ld. at 2569-70, 358 N.E.2d at 243. The Court affirmed the limita ion of back pay for 
the promotional position to the two week period she served in that ition, holding that 
the more liberal finding of the Commission was not supported by thee idence. I d. at 2570, 
358 N .E.2d at 243. 
During the Survey year the CommiBBion has awarded damages for' emotional distress" 
in several cases, including $5,000.00 in David v. Chelsea Police Dep., o. 74-E-727 -R, Jan. 
1, 1977; and $1,000.00 in Zifack v. Reading School System, Case No 72-S-166, Feb. 14, 
1977. The latter case is notable because there were no allegations or fi dings of retaliation. 
None of these cases have required any evidence as to whether compl inant actually suf-
fered emotional distreBB, or as to how much the damages should be 
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instances of egregious actions on the part of the employer. At the same 
time, the scope of employer actions which will be deemed sufficiently 
"egregious" to justify "emotional distress" damages is unclear. On the 
one hand, the Court could develop a "willfulness" or "maliciousness" 
standard which would apply to any instance of alleged discrimination. 
On the other hand, however, the Court could determine that retaliatory 
acts are sui generis in that they alone are sufficiently "egregious" to 
justify damages for emotional distress. Viewing cases of retaliation as 
sui generis, in turn, would presumably be based on those cases' peculiar 
capacity for disrupting the administrative processes of the Commission. 
Another significant question left open by Bournewood Hospital is 
whether the Commission is authorized to assess punitive or exemplary 
damages in cases of retaliation or other egregious employer behavior. 
While punitive or exemplary damages would appear to be "affirmative 
action" which could effectuate the purposes of chapter 151B, such dam-
ages seem precluded by the principle of ejusdem generis. In particular, 
section 5, in authorizing the Commission to take affirmative action, 
indicates that this action includes, but is not limited to, "hiring, rein-
statement or upgrading of employees, with or without back pay." All of 
the remedies specifically included in the Commission's power thus have 
the aim of compensating an injured employee. As a result; it would 
appear that section 5 would properly be construed as not authorizing 
punitive or exemplary damages, but rather as authorizing only damages 
of a compensatory nature. 
§4.5. Investigatory Power of the Commission-Subpoenas 
Duces Tecum. In Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination 
v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, the Supreme Judicial Court 
considered for the first time whether the Commission has the power to 
issue a subpoena duces tecum for the production of books and records 
during an investigation before a finding of probable case is made.• 
In Liberty Mutual, the Commission, prior to a hearing, issued a sub-
poena duces tecum for certain books and records relative to a matter 
under investigation.2 Liberty Mutual refused to comply with the sub-
poena and the Commission brought a bill of enforcement in superior 
court which was denied, whereupon the Commission appealed.3 The 
Commission's appeal was transferred to the Supreme Judicial Court, 
and the Court reversed} The Court found that as an agency created by 
statute, the Commission possessed only those powers "conferred upon 
it by statute and those reasonably necessary for its proper functioning."5 
§4.5. 1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2403, 356 N.E.2d 236. 
2 Id. at 2404, 356 N.E.2d at 237. 
3 Id. at 2405, 356 N.E.2d at 237-38. 
• Id., 356 N.E.2d at 238. 
'Id. 
12
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Thus, absent a statutory grant, the Commission would
1
be without au-
thority to issue a subpoena. Therefore the question before the Court was 
whether chapter 151B indeed granted the Commissiop the power to 
issue subpoenas in the course of prehearing investigations. 
Section 3(6) of chapter 151B confers on the Commiss~on the power to 
"receive, investigate and pass upon complaints of unfair practices." 
Section 3(7) empowers the Commission "[t]o hold beatings, subpoena 
witnesses, . . . take the testimony of any person un~er oath, and in 
connection therewith, to require the production for exabination of any 
books or papers relating to any matter under investigati'n or in question 
before the commission." 
The Commission argued that the clause "relating to any matter under 
investigation or in question ... " controls and therefore its subpoena 
power extends to the investigatory stage as well as to thb hearing stage. 6 
Liberty Mutual, urging the acceptance of a literal readi~g of the statute, 
argued that the subpoena power exists only "in connection" with the 
hearings. 7 The Court found that the statute "lacked pr~cision" and set 
for itself the task of determining which, if either, of the proponents' 
readings was correct. 8 I 
In construing the statutory language the Court initia~ly looked to the 
purpose of chapter 151B. Specifically, the Court prbmised that the 
chapter's purpose was to put an end to discrimination fn employment. 9 
The primary means for accomplishing this purpose was through the 
education of employers. However, the Court emphasize~ that the Com-
mission was also given "considerable power to proceed where appropri-
ate to ensure that efforts to eliminate discrimination wbuld be success-
ful. " 10 The Court further determined that the investigation of com-
plaints constitutes an important step in the process, without which the 
Commission's functions would be hampered and the st~tutory purposes 
impaired. 11 Therefore, on the basis of the importance of the investigative 
stage and the legislative direction that the statute shottld be construed 
liberally,l2 the Court concluded that chapter 151B didl grant the Com-
mission the power to issue a subpoena duces tecum during investi-
gatory proceedings. 13 In reaching this result the Colljrt distinguished 
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination v. Boston & Maine 
1 !d. at 2406, 356 N.E.2d at 238. 
7 !d. 
• ld. at 2407, 356 N.E.2d at 238. 
• ld. at 2408, 356 N.E.2d at 239. 
10 ld. 
II fd. 
12 G.L. c. 151B, §9. 
13 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2409, 356 N.E.2d at 239. 
I 
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R.R., 14 in which it had affirmed a superior court denial of the Commis-
sion's attempt to enforce an investigatory subpoena. 15 The Court stated 
that in Boston & Maine it had not negated the power of the Commission 
under chapter 151B to obtain relevant information at the investigative 
stage through subpoenas dtices tecum. Rather, it had merely deter-
mind that the information there sought was not relevant to the Com-
mission's investigation and therefore not authorized by the statute. 16 
" 357 Mass. 783, 260 N.E.2d 159 (1970). 
" ld. at 784, 260 N .E.2d at 160. 
•• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2411, 356 N.E.2d at 240. 
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